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ABSTRACT
Prior to the Veterans' Judicial Review Act, the Department of Veterans
Affairs existed in "splendid isolation," meaning that the Department was insu-
lated from judicial review by statute. After the due process revolution of the
1960s and pressure from various veterans' organizations after the Vietnam War,
Congress passed the Veterans' Judicial Review Act in 1988. The Act created
the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, an Article I court with exclusive
jurisdiction over decisions by the Board of Veterans' Appeals. This Article
argues that twenty years after the Veterans' Judicial Review Act was imple-
mented, the system has become more complex, requiring Congress to amend the
Veterans Affairs (VA) adjudication system. Specifically, this article advocates
that one of the many levels of regional office review should be eliminated and
that the Board of Veterans' Appeals should be regionalized to simplify the sys-
tem and provide more timely decisions to our nation's veterans.
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................... 68
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF VA CLAIMS PRIOR TO THE VJRA ............. 71
III. THE VETERANS' JUDICIAL REVIEW ACT OF 1988 ....... ......... 75
IV. THE EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ON THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS ..................................................... 79
A. Effects on the BVA ........................ 79
B. Effects at the RO Level ........................... 85
V. RECOMMENDATIONS ................................... ....... 87
VI. CONCLUSION ................................................. 92
Law clerk to the Honorable Lawrence B. Hagel, United States Court of Appeals for Veter-
ans Claims. B.A., College of the Holy Cross, 2004; J.D., Quinnipiac University School of Law,
2007. This Article was the First Prize Paper in the 2009 Paralyzed Veterans of American Annual
Legal Writing Contest.
1
Riley: Simplify, Simplify, Simplify-An Analysis of Two Decades of Judici
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2010
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
"Simplify, simplify, simplify!"' In analyzing the past two decades of
judicial review in the veterans' benefits adjudication system, Henry David Tho-
reau's declaration from his renowned work Walden comes to mind. Although
twenty years of judicial review has, overall, proven to be a positive addition to
the veterans' benefits arena, it has added an extra layer of review to an already
complicated system. Thus, in celebrating the twentieth anniversary of judicial
review, Congress would be wise to heed Thoreau's advice and "simplify" the
many layers of review in the veterans' benefits adjudication system.
In 1988, the Veterans' Judicial Review Act (VJRA) 2 dramatically af-
fected the veterans' benefits adjudication system by establishing the United
States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC). The CAVC is an Article
I court that was enacted to provide external judicial review of decisions by the
Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA). The implementation of judicial review
caused the BVA to make several significant improvements to its adjudication
process. For example, early CAVC decisions required the BVA to include a
statement of "reasons or bases" for its findings and conclusions, to eliminate its
panel of experts format, and to refrain from using its own medical judgment in
rendering BVA decisions.4
Nonetheless, a closer look at the Department of Veterans Affairs reveals
that twenty years after the VJRA was implemented, the system has become even
more complex than it was prior to judicial review. Although many envisioned
the newly created CAVC as a resource to simplify the veterans' benefits adjudi-
cation process,' judicial review has further complicated the system due to varied
effects on the BVA and the Regional Office (RO) levels of review. 6 In this re-
gard, most adjudicators at the RO levels are not attorneys and do not possess
any formal legal training.7 Therefore, at the initial levels of the veterans' bene-
fits adjudication process, judicial review has not produced great improvements
because those adjudicating veterans' claims are not only overwhelmed by their
HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN 66 (Signet Books 1949) (1854).
2 Veterans' Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988).
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS HISTORY,
http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/about/History.cfm (last visited Sept. 15, 2010) [hereinafter CAVC
HISTORY].
4 Charles L. Cragin, A Time of Transition at the Board of Veterans'Appeals, 38 FED. B. NEWS
& J. 500, 501-02 (1991); see also Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 171 (1991); Gilbert v. Der-
winski, I Vet. App. 49 (1990).
s James T. O'Reilly, Burying Caesar: Replacement of the Veterans Appeals Process is
Needed to Provide Fairness to Claimants, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 223, 248 (2001).
6 See BOARD OF VETERAN'S APPEALS, How Do I APPEAL? 3 (2002), available at
http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Pamphlets/010202A.pdf.
7 Jeffrey Parker, Two Perspectives on Legal Authority Within The Department of Veterans
Affairs Adjudication, I VETERANS L. REv. 208, 216 (2009).
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enormous workload, but are also not properly trained to utilize and apply CAVC
decisions.8 In fact, eight years after the implementation of judicial review,
Frank Q. Nebeker, former Chief Judge of the CAVC, testified before Congress
that the "VA had made no significant improvements in implementing the
[CAVC]'s decisions at its VARO's [Veterans' Affairs Regional Office]." 9 Ac-
cordingly, some scholars have argued that judicial review "put veterans in only
a marginally better position than they were in before the [VJRA was
enacted]."' 0
Despite this flaw, it is unfair to say that judicial review has not pro-
duced any benefits to the veterans' benefits adjudication system. Most impor-
tantly, judicial review has provided veterans with their "day in court," and has
brought the VA into alignment with modem notions of due process." In addi-
tion, the quality of BVA decisions has improved, and the CAVC has provided a
medium for debating the validity of VA regulations. As a result, a much-
needed body of case law on veterans' benefits issues has developed.12
Thus, after two decades of judicial review, the veterans' benefits adjudi-
cation system has improved, but it has also become more complex. The twen-
tieth anniversary of judicial review provides those involved with the veterans'
benefits adjudication system a valuable opportunity to assess the current system,
and most importantly, to simplify it.1' As stated above, most improvements
See generally id.; see also DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF., REPORT OF THE BUDGET SUBMISSION,
BENEFITS, AND BURIAL PROGRAMS AND DEPARTMENTAL ADMINISTRATION FISCAL YEAR 2011, at
2A-3 (2010), available at http://www4.va.gov/budget/docs/summary/Fy2011_Volume_3-
BenefitsandBurialandDept-Admin.pdf (noting that VA processed 3,044,423 compensation
claims in 2009, an estimated 3,291,766 claims in 2010, and will process an estimated 3,434,556
claims in 2011).
9 Bill Russo, Ten Years After the Battle for Veterans Judicial Review: An Assessment, 46 FED.
LAw. 26,28 (1999) (citing Department of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development,
and Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1998: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on VA, HUD,
and Independent Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong. 65 (1997) (Hon.
Frank Q. Nebeker, C. J., witness)).
10 Jonathan Goldstein, New Veterans Legislation Opens the Door to Judicial Review ... Slow-
ly!, 67 WASH. U. L. Q. 889, 921 (1989).
1 Laurence R. Helfer, The Politics of Judicial Structure: Creating the United States Court of
Veterans Appeals, 25 CONN. L. REv. 155, 162 (1992) (noting that other recipients of federal bene-
fits had the right to challenge their awards in court). See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (conferring
statutory right of judicial review of social security award determinations); see also Cushman v.
Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290, 1298 (2009) (holding that entitlement to VA benefits is a "property
interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment").
12 See Charles L. Cragin, The Impact of Judicial Review on the Department of Veterans Af-
fairs' Claims Adjudication Process: The Changing Role of the Board of Veterans' Appeals, 46
ME. L. REv. 23, 40 (1994); Lawrence B. Hagel & Michael P. Horan, Five Years Under the Veter-
ans'Judicial Review Act: The VA is Brought Kicking and Screaming Into the World of Meaning-
ful Due Process, 46 ME. L. REv. 43,46 (1994).
13 See generally Review of Veterans' Disability Compensation: What Changes are Needed to
Improve the Appeals Process? Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 111th Cong.
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have taken place at the BVA level; fewer improvements have taken place at the
RO level. 14 For example, although the effects of judicial review have still been
felt at the RO level in complying with the provisions of the Veterans Claims
Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA),1 5 many employees at the RO are simply too
busy working through the large backlog of claims to take notice of court prece-
dents. 16
This Article argues that in order for judicial review to have the "pro-
found"" effect that it was intended to on the VA, the RO, and BVA adjudication
processes must be simplified so that more emphasis may be placed on decisions
handed down from the CAVC. Specifically, this Article advocates for the posi-
tion that the VA should eliminate one of its many levels of review and utilize
attorneys at the RO level by regionalizing the BVA. Currently, the veterans'
benefits adjudication system involves an initial rating decision,' and, if a clai-
mant appeals that decision by filing a notice of disagreement (NOD), a state-
ment of the case (SOC) is issued.' 9 Both the rating decision and the SOC are
issued by non-attorney adjudicators at the RO.20 If the veteran remains dissatis-
fied with the decision after the SOC is issued, he or she can file a VA Form 9
and appeal the case to the BVA.2 1 At the BVA, the case is then adjudicated de
111-132 (2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-l11shrgl32/html/CHRG-
111 shrgl32.htm.
14 It should be noted, however, as of February 1, 1990, 38 U.S.C. § 5104(b) was added to the
law, which requires ROs to specify the evidence considered and the reasons for the disposition,
similar to the "reasons or bases" requirement placed on the BVA. See Crippen v. Brown, 9 Vet.
App. 412, 420 (1996).
15 Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.).
16 See Vietnam Veterans of America v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 654, 657 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating
that "VA's inventory of pending claims and their average time pending had increased 'significant-
ly' over the previous 3 years" (citing U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-749T,
CLAIMS PROCESSING PROBLEMS PERSIST AND MAJOR PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT MAY BE
DIFFICULT, 3 (2005))); U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-562T, PROCESSING OF
CLAIMS CONTINUES TO PRESENT CHALLENGES 3 (2007)); see also Michael P. Allen, The United
States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims at Twenty: A Proposal for a Legislative Commission
to Consider its Future, 58 CATH. U. L. REv. 361, 370 (2009) ("[T]he workload borne by many of
the links in the veterans' benefits chain of review is staggering. Understanding the magnitude of
the caseload at the various levels of decision is critical to assessing the success of the current
system as well as any changes that might be proposed to it.").
17 Effects ofJudicial Review, PARAPLEGIA NEWS, May 1993, at 47.
1 See 38 U.S.C. § 315 (2006).
19 See 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.201, 20.302 (2010) (noting that a decision is appealed by filing a notice
of disagreement); 38 C.F.R. § 19.29 (2010); see also Thomas J. Reed, Parallel Lines Never Meet:
Why the Military Disability Retirement and Veterans Affairs Department Claim Adjudication
Systems are a Failure, 19 WIDENER L. J. 57, 82-97 (2009) (noting the seven layers of review in
the veterans' benefits appeals process and the general inefficiency of the system).
20 Parker, supra note 7, at 216.
21 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(3) (2006); 38 C.F.R. § 20.302(b).
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novo by VA staff attorneys. If the veteran is still dissatisfied with the outcome
of his or her benefits claim, he or she may appeal to the CAVC.2 3 Thereafter, in
certain limited circumstances, a veteran can appeal his or her case to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and ultimately, to the United
States Supreme Court. 24 Therefore, in order to simplify the system, this Article
proposes eliminating the SOC stage of review and regionalizing the BVA, such
that a de novo decision by an attorney would be issued following the filing of a
NOD. Furthermore, to ensure better decision-making in the process, Decision
Review Officers (DROs), who are usually more experienced than RO non-
attorney adjudicators that issue SOCs, should perform initial rating decisions.
Part II of this Article provides a history of the preclusion of judicial re-
view in the processing of veterans' benefits claims. Next, Part III discusses the
history of the VJRA, focusing on the establishment of the CAVC. Part IV then
analyzes the effects of judicial review within the VA over the past twenty years,
including its effects on the BVA and the RO. Subsequently, Part V provides
recommendations as to how the effects of judicial review may further benefit
the VA system by restructuring and simplifying the current veterans' benefits
adjudication system. Finally, Part VI provides a brief conclusion of this Article.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF VA CLAIMS PRIOR TO THE VJRA
Despite the fact that there was a "basic presumption of judicial review"
of administrative action 2 5 prior to the passage of the VJRA, the VA stood in
"splendid isolation" as the only administrative agency that was exempt from
26 intajudicial review. The initial barrier to judicial review of veterans' claims was
passed in 1887, when Congress provided for the specific preclusion of judicial
review in cases involving veterans' pensions pursuant to the Tucker Act.27
However, Congressional legislation that explicitly precluded judicial review of
veterans' claims was not passed until 1924, when the World War Veterans Act
provided that decisions by the Veterans Bureau were "conclusive."28 In 1930,
when the Veterans Administration (the predecessor to the current Department of
22 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(3) (2006); 38 C.F.R. § 20.302(b).
23 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (2006).
24 38 U.S.C. § 7252(c) (2006).
25 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967); see also 38 U.S.C. §211(a)
(1988).
26 Robert L. Rabin, Preclusion of Judicial Review in the Processing of Claims for Veterans'
Benefits: A Preliminary Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 905, 905 (1975); see also James D. Ridgway,
The Splendid Isolation Revisited: Lessons from the History of Veterans Benefits Before Judicial
Review, 3 VETERANS L. REv. (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://works.bepress.com/james-ridgway/4.
27 Rabin, supra note 26, at 907 n. 14.
28 WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., THE LAW OF VETERANS BENEFITS: JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 6 (3d ed.
2002).
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Veterans Affairs) was created to replace the former Veterans Bureau, Congress
maintained this provision.29 Shortly thereafter, the Economy Act of 1933 estab-
lished a non-review clause of VA decisions.30 Specifically, section five of the
Economy Act stated that VA decisions were final, and as such, no court in the
United States had the authority to conduct judicial review of such decisions.31
Further, the VA was also specifically exempt from the rule-making procedures
set out in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 32 The non-review clause
was codified at 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) and remained in effect in various forms until
the passage of the VJRA in 1988.33
Although 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) remained in effect for over fifty years, the
issue of judicial review of veterans' benefits claims continuously emerged dur-
ing that timeframe. Beginning in 1952, the first Congressional hearings on the
topic were held.34 At that time, a pattern emerged that would be repeated until
the passage of the VJRA some thirty-five years later; some veterans service
organizations, as well as the VA, opposed external judicial review of VA deci-
sions, while other veterans service organizations, as well as several other organ-
izations such as the American Bar Association, supported external judicial re-
view of VA decisions.3 5 Arguments against judicial review included fears that
federal courts would be overburdened by an influx of claims, that the judiciary
would become entangled in complex decisions best left to agency expertise, that
judicial review would result in inconsistent decisions, and that the informal, pro-
claimant nature of the VA system would be lost if VA claims were taken to a
more adversarial setting, such as the federal court system." In an April 23,
1959 letter, the VA summarized its position, stating:
29 Id. at 6-7.
30 Kenneth B. Kramer, Judicial Review of the Theoretically Non-Reviewable: An Overview of
Pre-COVA Court Action on Claims for Veteran Benefits, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 99, 100 (1990).
31 Id.
32 See Parker, supra note 7, at 210 (noting the VA's "long and unique history of exemption
from APA rulemaking procedures and judicial review.. ."); see also Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487
U.S. 879, 908 n.46 (1988); James Hunicutt, Another Reason to Reform the Federal Regulatory
System: Agencies' Treating Nonlegislative Rules as Binding Law, 41 B.C. L. REv. 153, 156, 189
(1999) (noting that Congress passed the Administrative Procedure (APA) Act in 1946 "to pro-
mote uniformity, fairness and public participation in how agencies operate" and that "the purpose
of the APA is to bolster clarity, consistency and public participation in federal agencies").
3 Kramer, supra note 30, at 100 n.5 ("Title 38 of the United States Code generally deals with
veterans' benefits. The preclusion provision of title 38 was rewritten in 1940 and 1958. Some of
the 1958 language in the non-review provision was altered in 1970 in order to clarify its mean-
ing."). See also Kim Lacy Morris, Judicial Review of Non-Reviewable Administrative Action:
Veterans Administration Benefits Claims, 29 ADMIN. L. REv. 65 (1977).
34 Hagel & Horan, supra note 12, at 44-45.
3 Id. at 45 (citing H.R. REP. No.100-963, 10 (1998), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782).
36 Goldstein, supra note 10, at 891; see generally PAUL C. LIGHT, FORGING LEGISLATION
(1992).
72 [Vol. 113
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In the final analysis, the question posed by the bill is whether
there is any demonstrated need for, or real benefit to be derived
from, the imposition of an additional review system with its at-
tendant delays, uncertainties, and extra expense, upon an appel-
late system which has functioned fairly and efficiently for 25
years. We think not.37
Arguments in favor of judicial review included "the popular tendency to
consider access to court a fundamental aspect of due process of law[,]" 3 8 as well
as veterans' perceived injustice provided by the VA system.39 Additional Con-
gressional hearings considering the issue of judicial review of veterans' benefits
claims were also conducted in 1960, 1962, 1970, 1980, 1983, and 1986.40 How-
ever, the establishment of external judicial review was hindered by a lack of
agreement as to what such review would entail and what form it would take.4 1
In the meantime, several attempts were made to challenge the provi-
sions of 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) in court. A series of cases from the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia (D.C. Circuit) held that veterans were only
precluded from contesting denials of VA benefits; thus, a claimant could chal-
lenge the termination of benefits.42 In response to this line of cases, the provi-
sions of 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) were changed in 1970 in order to further insulate the
VA from judicial review.4 3 The rationale provided for this revision to the statute
was to make it "perfectly clear that Congress intends to exclude from judicial
review all determinations with respect to non-contractual benefits provided for
veterans and their dependents and survivors."4
Despite the 1970 revisions, in 1974, the Supreme Court heard the case
of Johnson v. Robison.4 5 In that case, Robison, a conscientious objector to the
37 John J. Farley, III, The New Kid on the Block of Veterans Law, 38 FED. B. NEWS & J. 488
(1991) (citing Judicial Review of Veterans' Claims, 1960: Hearing on H.R. 947, 975, 1202, 3048,
4146, 5986, 8375, 9591, and 9632 Before the Subcomm. on Pending Judicial Review Legislation
of the H. Comm. of Veterans'Affairs, 86th Cong. (1960) (letter to the then Chairman of the House
Committee on Veteran's Affairs by the then Administrator Sumner G. Whittier)).
38 Rabin, supra note 26, at 905.
3 Hagel & Horan, supra note 12, at 44.
40 Id. at 45.
41 Farley, supra note 37, at 488.
42 Tracy v. Gleason, 379 F.2d 469, 473-74 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Thompson v. Gleason, 317 F.2d
901, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Wellman v. Whittier, 259 F.2d 163, 168-69 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (stating
that a law that precludes review of VA decisions concerning a claim for benefits does not also
preclude challenge to forfeiture of those benefits).
43 Goldstein, supra note 10, at 892 n.24 ("[Tlhe House report on H.R. 17958, which effected
this change, specifically mentioned the three D.C. Circuit cases."); H.R. REP. No. 91-1166, at 9-
11(1970)).
4 H.R. REP. No. 91-1166 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3723,
3731.
45 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
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Vietnam War, filed a claim for VA educational benefits under the Veterans'
Readjustment Act of 1966.46 However, because he had performed alternate civil
service rather than active duty service, his claim was denied on the basis that he
did not meet the statutory "active duty" service requirements.47 Robison argued
that the active duty requirement was unconstitutional and asserted that the sta-
tute denied him freedom of religion and equal protection of the laws pursuant to
the First and Fifth Amendments, respectively.4 8 In response, the VA argued that
38 U.S.C. § 211(a) barred Robison's claim and that his constitutional claims
were invalid.4 9 Although Robison ultimately lost his case on the merits, the
Supreme Court did grant him the right to judicial review of his claim. The Su-
preme Court held that 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) applied only to decisions of law or
fact in VA benefit claims, and that in Robison's case, the question of law pre-
sented arose under the Constitution, not under the facts or law of his VA bene-
fits decision.50
The Supreme Court revisited the issue of judicial review of veterans'
benefits decisions in 1988 when it decided Traynor v. Turnage.f In that case, a
group of veterans argued that the VA, through a provision that denied benefits
to primary alcoholics, violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.5 2 The veterans
argued that 38 C.F.R. §3.301(c)(2), which categorized primary alcoholism as
"willful misconduct," discriminated against the handicapped and violated § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. 3 The Supreme Court again granted judicial review of
the claim, but just as in Robison, the claimants also lost on the merits.5 4 None-
theless, the Supreme Court opened the door to judicial review of veterans'
claims slightly wider by holding that it could review a VA regulation to ensure
that it complied with a non-VA statute.
Although the Supreme Court only made two exceptions to the VA's
non-review statute in its fifty-five year history, the importance of these two ex-
ceptions should not be overlooked. Once the door to judicial review was
46 Id. at 362-64.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 364.
49 Id. at 364-65.
50 Id.
s' 485 U.S. 535 (1988).
52 Id. at 540. See also 38 C.F.R. §3.301(c)(2)(1987) (defining "primary alcoholism" as alco-
holism unrelated to an underlying psychiatric disorder and labeling it as "willful misconduct").
s3 Traynor, 485 U.S. at 540.
54 Id. at 546-53.
ss Id. at 540-44.
56 But see Kramer, supra note 30 (summarizing other areas where courts granted review of VA
claims).
[Vol. 11374
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cracked, Congress began to examine the issue more closely.57 In addition, vet-
erans continued to voice their complaints to Congress about the perceived inep-
titude of the VA and the arbitrary and unfair nature of its decision-making
process.58  The combination of these two factors soon paved the way for the
enactment of the VJRA.
III. THE VETERANS' JUDICIAL REVIEW ACT OF 1988
Although veterans and various veterans' service organizations had been
dissatisfied with the VA adjudication process for many years, in the 1980's
Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA) became even more dissatisfied because
the VA failed to recognize many Vietnam-era veterans' claims.5 9 In particular,
veteran exposure to herbicides, such as Agent Orange, was not accepted as a
basis for VA disability benefits. 6 0 Thus, the VVA pushed for judicial review as
way of legitimizing Vietnam-era veterans' claims, as well as a means to create a
more impartial system overall. In vociferously advocating for judicial review,
VVA "rel[ied] on the pervasive public sentiment that every American has a
right to have his or her 'day in court[.]"' 62 Indeed, VVA pointed out to both
Congress and the media that while groups such as illegal aliens and criminals
had the right to judicial review, veterans did not.63 Such realizations prompted
many to wonder why veterans, "who defended our government in time of need
... are now forced to petition that government to gain equal access to the same
fundamental rights that [they] fought to secure for others."6 4
57 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 87-97 (codified as 38 U.S.C. § 7104); Pub. L. No. 87-666 (codified as
38 U.S.C. §7015); Pub. L. No. 85-857 (codified as 38 U.S.C. §5110).
5 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 10, at 895.
59 See A SHORT HISTORY OF VVA, VIETNAM VETERANS OF AM.,
http://www.vva.org/history.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2010) ("By the late 1970s, it was clear the
established veterans groups had failed to make a priority of the issues of concern to Vietnam
veterans.").
60 See Judicial Review of Veterans' Affairs: Hearing on H.R. 639 and S. 11 Before the H.
Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 100th Cong., 16 (1988) (statement of Rep. Lane Evans); see also
Light, supra note 36.
61 See NAT'L Ass'N OF STATE DIRS. OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, HOUSE COMM. ON VETERANS'
AFFAIRS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 41ST ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
STATE DIRECTORS OF VETERANS AFFAIRS ON JUDICIAL REVIEW OF VA ADMINISTRATIVE
DETERMINATIONS 24 (1988) (statement of Jack Powell, National Executive Director, Paralyzed
Veterans of America).
62 Helfer, supra note 11, at 162.
63 Id.
6 H.R. 585 and Other Bills Relating to Judicial Review of Veterans' Claims: Hearings on
H.R. 585 Before the House Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 99th Cong. 233 (1986) (statement of
Robert O. Muller, president of the VVA).
2010] 75
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Accordingly, the VJRA was signed into law by President Ronald Rea-
gan on November 19, 1988.65 The final version of the VJRA accomplished five
objectives: (1) it repealed 38 C.F.R. § 211; (2) it created the CAVC (originally
known as the United States Court of Veterans Appeals or COVA),66 an Article I
court, to perform external, independent judicial review of decisions by the BVA;
(3) it maintained the BVA as the final administrative adjudicator within the VA;
(4) it abolished the $10 limit on attorneys fees for cases being heard at the
CAVC; and (5) it created an additional level of judicial review, allowing for
certain cases to be appealed from the CAVC to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit.67
The CAVC took the form of a "traditional federal appellate court, 6 8 and
was completely independent of the VA.69 Section 4053 of Title 38 of the United
States Code provided for a chief judge and two to six associate judges to be ap-
pointed by the President for fifteen year terms.70 Appeals could be heard by a
single judge, by a panel, or by the full court. 1 In terms of jurisdiction, the
CAVC was given exclusive authority to review final decisions by the BVA.72 n
addition, only claimants who were dissatisfied with a BVA decision obtained
the right to appeal to the CAVC; the VA could not appeal a decision favorable
to the claimant.73 The CAVC's decisions were to be based solely on the evi-
65 Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988) (codified in various sections throughout 38
U.S.C.).
66 The Court's name was changed, effective March 1, 1999, pursuant to the Veterans Programs
Enhancement Act of 1998. See Pub. L. No. 105-368, §511, 112 Stat. 3315, 3341; see also CAVC
HISTORY, supra note 3.
67 Fox, supra note 28, at 17.
68 Farley, supra note 37, at 489.
69 See Watson v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 352, 352 (2010) ("[T]his Court is an independent
Federal Court. The Court is not part of VA, and it is wholly separate from VA and the Board."
(citing 38 U.S.C. § 7251)).
70 38 U.S.C. § 4053 (a), (c) (recodified in 1991 as 38 U.S.C. § 7253(a),(c)); but see Veterans'
Benefits Improvements Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-389, § 601, 122 Stat. 4145, 4176-77
(amending 38 U.S.C. § 7253 by increasing the total number of judges to serve on the CAVC from
seven to nine, effective December 2009).
71 38 U.S.C. § 4054(b) (recodified in 1991 as 38 U.S.C. § 7254(b)); see also Frankel v. Der-
winski, 1 Vet. App. 23, 25-26 (1990) ("If, after due consideration, the Court determines that the
case on appeal is of relative simplicity and: 1. does not establish a new rule of law; 2. does not
alter, modify, criticize, or clarify an existing rule of law; 3. does not apply an established rule of
law to a novel fact situation; 4. does not constitute the only recent, binding precedent on a particu-
lar point of law within the power of the Court to decide; 5. does not involve a legal issue of con-
tinuing public interest; and 6. the outcome is not reasonably debatable . . ." then a memorandum,
rather than a panel, decision will be issued.).
72 38 U.S.C. § 4052(a) (recodified in 1991 as 38 U.S.C. §7252(a)); see Kyhn v. Shinseki, 23
Vet. App. 335, 343 (2010).
7 38 U.S.C. § 4052(a); 38 U.S.C. §4066(a) (recodified in 1991 as 38 U.S.C. §7266(a)); see,
e.g., Ricafort v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 198, 202 (2007) ("[I]n order for a claimant to obtain
review of a Board decision by this Court, that decision must be final and the person adversely
affected by that decision must file a Notice of Appeal within 120 days after the date on which the
76 [Vol. 113
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dence of record that was before the VA at the time the unfavorable decision was
made.74 In this regard, the CAVC could not conduct de novo review of factual
determinations made by the BVA." Indeed, the CAVC has repeatedly made
clear that "[b]ecause [it is] a Court of review, it is not appropriate for [it] to
make a de novo finding, based on the evidence, of [a factual matter]."7 After
reviewing the record, the CAVC was to "affirm, modify, or reverse [the] deci-
sion of the [BVA] or to remand the matter, as appropriate."?r
The CAVC's standard of review was based on the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA).x Pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7261, the CAVC may only over-
turn the BVA's findings of fact if such findings are "clearly erroneous."80 De-
scribing this standard, retired CAVC Judge John J. Farley stated:
This means that the [CAVC] does not decide whether a veteran
was injured or whether such an injury was service-connected.
Rather, it reviews the decision of the fact-finder, the Board of
Veterans' Appeals, on such issues and, if there is a basis in the
record for the Board's conclusion, even if this court might dis-
agree with that conclusion, it cannot reverse the Board's deci-
sion. This restrictive standard of review is designed to ensure
Board decision was mailed."); Breeden v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 475, 477 (2004) ("The Secretary
may not seek review of any such decision."); see also Kirkpatrick v. Nicholson, 417 F.3d 1361,
1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that a Board remand is not a final decision for jurisdictional
purposes).
74 38 U.S.C. §4052(b) (recodified in 1991 as 38 U.S.C. §7252(b)); see also Rogozinski v.
Derwinski, I Vet. App. 19, 20 (1990) (holding that the record on appeal before the Court is li-
mited to the evidence of record at the time of the proceedings before the Secretary and BVA).
7 38 U.S.C. §4601(c) (recodified in 1991 as 38 U.S.C. §7261(c)); see Kelly v. Brown, 7 Vet.
App. 471, 474 (1995) ("[T]he Court is unable to review the record without engaging in fact-
finding, which is not the role of this Court in the first instance." (citing Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1
Vet. App. 49, 56-57 (1990)).
76 Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Webster v. Derwinski, 1
Vet. App. 155, 159 (1991)); see also Landicho v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 42, 48 (1994) (stating that
"[t]his Court is not generally an initial trier of facts. In appeals of BVA decisions, this Court
reviews fact determinations made by the Board and does not engage in de novo fact-finding"
(citing 38 U.S.C. §7261(a)(4), (c))); Badua v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 472, 473 (1993) ("[T]he deter-
mination whether appellant's third wife . . . is his lawful spouse for the purposes of receiving
additional VA disability pension benefits . . . is a finding of fact that the Court must affirm unless
that determination is found to be 'clearly erroneous."'); Bledsoe v. Derwinski, I Vet. App. 32, 33
(1990) (stating that the "clearly erroneous" standard must be applied in assessing the Board's
factual "determination of the capacity of the appellant's son to support himself"); Gilbert v. Der-
winski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990).
n 38 U.S.C. §4052(a) (recodified in 1991 as 38 U.S.C. §7252(a)); see, e.g., Stillwell v. Brown,
6 Vet. App. 291, 297 (1994).
78 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2009).
79 Formerly 38 U.S.C. §4061.
so 38 U.S.C. § 4061(a)(4) (recodified in 1991 as 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(4)).
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that the court does not merely substitute its judgment for that of
the Board of Veterans' Appeals on factual determinations.8 1
To further clarify the "clearly erroneous" standard, the CAVC, in Boo-
ton v. Brown,82 described this standard by stating that "[t]o be clearly erroneous,
a decision must strike us as more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must ...
strike us as wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead
fish . . ..
Thus, the CAVC's primary function is to review cases that have been
appealed from the BVA for clear errors and questions of law.84 In addition, the
CAVC has the authority to set aside legal determinations made by the Secretary,
the BVA, or the Chairman of the Board, as well as the authority to "compel ac-
tion of the Secretary unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed."8 The
86CAVC may also issue contempt citations and other writs as necessary.
In summary, the VJRA eliminated the bar to judicial review of VA de-
cisions by creating the CAVC pursuant to Article I of the U.S. Constitution.
The VJRA also abolished the previous fee limit for attorneys representing veter-
ans at the CAVC.88 When the CAVC convened for the first time on October 16,
1989,89 a new era of veterans law was bom which changed the course of the
veterans' benefits adjudication process. The actual significance of those
changes is discussed in the section that follows.
81 Farley, supra note 37, at 489; see also Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. 49, 52-53.
82 8 Vet. App. 368, 422 (1995).
83 Id. at 372 (quoting Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th
Cir. 1988)); see Padgett v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 133 (2005) (en banc) (holding that under the
"clearly erroneous" standard of review, a Board finding can be reversed on appeal without uncon-
troverted evidence in the appellant's favor and overruled any suggestion to the contrary in court's
prior decisions, including Hicks v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 417, 422 (1995) (quoting Hersey v. Der-
winski, 2 Vet. App. 91, 95 (1992))).
84 Farley, supra note 37, at 489.
85 38 U.S.C. §4061(a)(2), (3) (recodified in 1991 as 38 U.S.C. §7261(a)(2), (3)).
86 38 U.S.C. §4065(a), (b) (recodified in 1991 as 38 U.S.C. §7265(a), (b)).
87 CAvc HISTORY, supra note 3; see generally Allen, supra note 16.
88 Allen, supra note 16.
89 The Court convened for the first time in a borrowed ceremonial courtroom from the United
States District Court of the District of Columbia. See Farley, supra note 37, at 490. Chief Justice
of the U.S. Supreme Court, William B. Rehnquist and Chief Judge of the CAVC, Frank Q. Ne-
beker, presided. Id. Interestingly, Rehnquist noted that the CAVC shared its birthday with the
U.S. Supreme Court, which was formed on that date two hundred years earlier, in 1789. Id.
78 [Vol. 113
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IV. THE EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ON THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS
Initially, the most obvious effect of judicial review on the veterans'
benefits adjudication process has been providing veterans with due process.90
Throughout the past twenty years, judicial review has granted thousands of vet-
erans their day in court.91 Most notably, the addition of judicial review to the
veterans' benefits arena has also brought "VA procedures within the mainstream
of American administrative law." 92
The past twenty years have proven that judicial review has had both
positive and negative effects on the VA. The positive effects of judicial review
include providing veterans with due process, attorney involvement in the claims
process, better quality BVA decisions, and the production of a uniform body of
law for veterans claims adjudicators to apply. The negative effects of judicial
review include the increased amount of time required to process claims as well
as the CAVC's high remand rate.93  However, most of the effects of these
changes, both positive and negative, are felt primarily at the BVA.
A. Effects on the BVA
One of the first major changes to be brought about by judicial review,
and perhaps one of the most important, was the transformation of the BVA deci-
sion making process.94 These changes included how BVA decisions were made
as well as the format of such decisions. Prior to the era of judicial review, phy-
sicians served as Board members and were an integral part of the BVA decision
process. 95 However, once judicial review was imposed, the CAVC often found
that BVA decisions were based on the opinions of the participating Board mem-
90 See, e.g., Hagel & Horan, supra note 12; see also Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).
91 See, e.g., U.S. CT. OF APP. FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, ANNUAL REPORTS (2008), available at
http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/Annual Report-_2008 1.pdf [hereinafter CAVC
ANNUAL REPORT FY 2008] (providing the number of new claims filed at the CAVC each year
from 1999 to 2008).
92 William F. Fox, Jr., Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Veterans Benefits System, 13
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 339, 342 (2004).
9 See Allen, supra note 16, at 378 ("Remands have also plagued matters at the Veterans
Court. Disaggregating the statistics the Court provides to determine the precise number of re-
mands is not an easy task. According to a report prepared by the House Veterans' Affairs Com-
mittee in 2007 the Veterans Court issued '3,211 merit decisions, the majority of which, more than
2,000, were remanded (some in part only) and 1,098 were affirmed.' (quoting H. R. REP. No.
110-789, at 18 (2008))); see also James D. Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?: A Comparative
Analysis of Appellate Review by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 1
VETERANS L. REv. 113 (2009).
94 See generally Cragin, supra note 4; Cragin supra note 12, at 23.
9 Cragin, supra note 4, at 501.
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ber-physicians. 96 The participating Board member-physicians often provided
findings and conclusions that were not sufficiently explained by the record,
which made judicial review of the decisions difficult. 97
One of the first major cases decided by the CAVC, Colvin v. Derwins-
ki,98 held that the BVA panels could only consider "independent medical evi-
dence to support their findings" rather than provide their own medical judgment
in the guise of a Board opinion. 99 Subsequent to this decision, the BVA phased
out the role of physicians as Board members.100 Currently, most decisions are
made by a single Board member who is now referred to as a Veterans Law
Judge. 01 The BVA has retained a small number of physicians to serve in an
advisory role; however, physicians no longer participate in the BVA adjudica-
tion process, and the BVA can no longer rely on its own medical determinations
in rendering a decision.'02
In addition, judicial review has arguably improved the quality of BVA
decisions. o0 Most notably, the VJRA required BVA decisions to contain a
statement of "reasons or bases" with regard to "findings and conclusions on all
material issues of fact and law presented on the record." 0 4 The CAVC wasted
no time in asserting that it intended to enforce this provision. In Gilbert v. Der-
winski, the CAVC explained that a BVA decision must "contain clear analysis
and succinct but complete explanations." 05 Further, "[a] bare conclusory
statement, without both supporting analysis and explanation, is neither helpful
to a veteran nor 'clear enough to permit effective judicial review,' nor in com-
pliance with statutory requirements." 0 6 Although the BVA defended its prior
format by stating that "the most significant motivation for providing a truncated
explanation for the basis of a decision was the necessity of processing an
enormous caseload in a timely manner with limited resources," 0 7 the CAVC has
continued to vigorously and unremittingly enforce this requirement on the
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 1 Vet. App. 171 (1991).
99 Id. at 175.
'0 Cragin, supra note 12, at 26.
1o See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7101, 7101A (2006); it should also be noted that on occasion, the Board
still uses three member panels to decide cases. However, all three panel members are Veterans
Law Judges.
102 Cragin, supra note 12, at 26.
103 See Allen, supra note 16, at 376.
10 38 U.S.C. § 4004 (recodified in 1991 as 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1)).
105 1 Vet. App. 49, 57 (1990).
106 Id.
107 Cragin, supra note 12, at 25.
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BVA.'0o In fact, the need for a more adequate statement of reasons or bases
continues to be the most frequently cited reason for remanding cases to the
BVA. 109
Despite the large number of remands that have resulted from enforce-
ment of the reasons or bases requirement, most involved with the system agree
that judicial review has had a positive effect on the overall quality of the veter-
ans' benefits adjudication process.1 10 Although it may take longer to issue a
BVA decision in order to comply with this requirement, subsequent BVA deci-
sions have been more helpful to veterans and have allowed for more effective
judicial review."'
Judicial review has had other positive effects on the VA decision mak-
ing process as well. The VJRA eliminated the $10 fee limitation placed on at-
torneys representing veterans before the CAVC. 112 Recent legislation has also
allowed attorneys to receive compensation for representing claimants before the
VA.113 Although the VA and some veterans' service organizations had long
opposed attorney representation in the veterans' benefits adjudication system,"l4
thus far, attorneys have had a positive effect on the system.1 5 In this regard, a
"specter of litigious, overzealous counsel has not yet materialized as a serious or
systemic problem."I 16 To the contrary, attorney representation has been shown
to greatly improve a veteran's chances of winning his or her case." 7
1os See, e.g., Polovick v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 48 (2009); Anderson v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App.
423 (2009).
109 Fox, supra note 28, at 98; see, e.g., Spurgeon v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 194 (1997); Lathan v.
Brown, 7 Vet. App. 359 (1995).
110 See Allen, supra note 16, at 372; see also Fox, supra note 92, at 342.
II See Gilbert v. Derwinski, I Vet. App. 49, 57 (1990).
112 Veterans' Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988). The
$10 fee limitation was previously found at 38 U.S.C. § 3404(c). See also Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n
of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 306 (1985).
" See Pub. L. No. 109-461, § 101, 120 Stat. 3405 (2006); see also 38 U.S.C. §§ 5902-5905
(2006) (shifting the entry point for paid representation as of June 20, 2007, and amending the
provisions relating to fee assessments and review of fee agreements).
114 See Victoria L. Collier & Drew Early, Cracks in the Armour: Due Process, Attorney's Fees,
and the Department of Veterans Affairs, 18 ELDER L.J. 1, 16 (2010) ("Some VSOs, such as the
Disabled American Veterans, opposed proposals to increase attorney participation in the
process."); Benjamin W. Wright, The Potential Repercussions of Denying Disabled Veterans the
Freedom to Hire an Attorney, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 433, 442 (2009) ("The rationale of keeping costs
low by proscribing attorney involvement was that, if veterans had attorneys, then so would the VA
and costs and time would increase.").
Its Russo, supra note 9, at 28.
116 Cragin, supra note 12, at 27; see generally Wright, supra note 114.
117 Professor William Fox, Presentation at the Fourth Annual Judicial Conference, 10 Vet. App.
No. 3, p. LXXVII (1996); see also Kristi A. Estrada, Welcome Home: Our Nation's Shameful
History of Caring for Combat Veterans and How Expanding Presumptions for Service Connection
Can Help, 26 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 113, 125 (2009) ("[A]s many as 25% of all appeals to the ...
2010] 81
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Furthermore, and also of much importance, judicial review has resulted
in a uniform body of veterans case law.' 18 One of the main arguments for creat-
ing the CAVC as a specialized Article I court was to confine review of VA deci-
sions to a single forum, rather than to "regional circuits where disuniformity can
arise because of the absence of intercircuit stare decisis."" 9 In addition, veter-
ans law is complex, and therefore the CAVC, as a specialized court, has proven
better able to make correct decisions on relevant veterans law topics.120 For
example, in Shinseki v. Sanders,'21 the U.S. Supreme Court found that
[i]t is the Veterans Court, not the Federal Circuit, that sees suf-
ficient case-specific raw material in veterans' cases to enable it
to make empirically based, nonbinding generalizations about
"natural effects." And the Veterans Court, which has exclusive
jurisdiction over these cases, is likely better able than is the
Federal Circuit to exercise an informed judgment as to how of-
ten veterans are harmed by which kinds of notice errors.122
Thus, judicial review has had a positive effect on the BVA because
CAVC decisions are received from a centralized authority, and accordingly,
there is less difficulty in interpreting and applying court precedents to VA
claims.12 3 Further, because the CAVC's judicial precedents have clearly and
succinctly stated many essential veterans law principles, the VA is currently in
the process of rewriting its regulations to, inter alia, directly include many court
(CAVC) are dismissed for procedural reasons; a statistic that would likely be much lower if more
veterans were represented by attorneys."); Wright, supra note 114, at 445.
" Allen, supra note 16, at 372-73.
" Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U.
PA. L. REv. 1111, 1114 (1990).
120 See id. at ll l7.
121 129 S. Ct. 1696 (2009).
122 Id. at 1707; cf United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 394 (1999) (The Article
I Court's "expertise ... guides it in making complex determinations in a specialized area of the
law . . .. ").
123 See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 1 (1989); Kevin E. Lunday & Harvey Rishikof, Due Process Is a
Strategic Choice: Legitimacy and the Establishment of an Article III National Security Court, 39
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 87, 110 (2008) (arguing for the benefits of courts of specialized jurisdiction,
specifically that "[t]he United States should create a specialized Article III National Security
Court to provide an effective, constitutionally balanced means for detention, treatment, and trial of
suspected terrorists and provide for sufficient due process under domestic and international legal
standards").
82 [Vol. 1 13
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precedents. 124 In addition to incorporating judicial precedents, the regulation
rewrite project greatly simplifies the veterans' benefits regulatory scheme.125
In spite of the positive effects of judicial review, such review has also
produced some negative effects on the BVA.12 6 First and foremost, judicial
review has caused a significant increase in the amount of time required to
process veterans' benefits claims.127 As was noted shortly after the imposition
of judicial review, "applicable law, as articulated by the decisions of the
[CAVC], is changing on almost a daily basis. Because of the increasing com-
plexity and rapidly evolving state of the law, BVA decisions are lengthier, more
complex, and require more time to prepare than ever before."1 28 Although there
are numerous CAVC precedents that affect the timeliness of the veterans claims
process, the most significant factor has been the CAVC's extensive interpreta-
tion of the VA's duty to assist claimants, including the passage of the VCAA.129
Indeed, it is essential that the BVA enforce the VA's compliance with this duty,
for example, by remanding claims for proper assistance, obtaining medical
records,'30 or providing an adequate VA medical examination. 13 1 However,
complying with the duty to assist ultimately delays the BVA's decision, which
in turn may delay a veteran's entitlement to VA benefits such as health care or
monetary compensation. Nonetheless, the BVA is slowly adapting to these
124 See William L. Pine & William F. Russo, Making Veterans Benefits Clear: VA's Regulation
Rewrite Project, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 407, 417 (2009).
125 See generally id. at 409.
126 See Allen, supra note 16, at 377.
127 See id. ("At the Board in 2007, the average time between the date an appeal was physically
received and the date when the Board mailed a decision to the veteran was 136 days.").
128 Cragin, supra note 12, at 33; see also DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF., REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN
FISCAL YEAR 2009 (2010), available at http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans
_AnnuaLRpts/BVA2009AR.pdf [hereinafter BVA CHAIRMAN'S REPORT FOR FY 2009].
129 Cragin, supra note 12, at 35; Tom Philpott, Law to Help Vets Also Slowed Claims,
MILITARY.COM (July 10, 2008), http://www.military.com/features/0, 15240,171460,00.html (noting
that since the passage of the VCAA in 2000, "two thirds of the time required to process a claim is
committed to blocks of time set up to develop evidence to support the claim").
130 See, e.g., Loving v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 96, 102 (2005) (holding that the Secretary's
duty to assist includes making "'reasonable efforts to obtain relevant records,"' as long as the
claimant "'adequately identifies' those records to the Secretary and authorizes the Secretary to
obtain them" (quoting Veterans Claims Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096
(2000))).
131 See, e.g., Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 311 (2007) (holding that if VA undertakes
the duty to provide an appellant with a VA medical examination, it must ensure that such exami-
nation is adequate for rating purposes).
132 See Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2010). In Shinseki,
appellants, two veterans' associations, argued that the VA violated the APA and the Due Process
Clause because of the average time it took the VA to process veterans' benefits claims. Id. The
D.C. Circuit ultimately dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Id.
832010]
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changes-fiscal year 2008 was the most productive year for the BVA since
1991.1,
The problems resulting from such lengthy delays have caused some to
call for the elimination of both the BVA and the CAVC.'34 Indeed, a leading
scholar of administrative law has stated that judicial review of veterans' claims
was a failed experiment.' 35 To this end, he noted that when Congress passed
judicial review, its vision was to have the CAVC decide cases and return them
to the VA for payment. 13 6 Instead, judicial review resulted in a large number of
remands that prolonged claims processing time and postponed final decisions. 3 1
Moreover, the CAVC has been criticized as being too deferential to the VA.138
Related to the increased time required to process veterans' claims sub-
sequent to judicial review is the CAVC's high remand rate.' 39 Most cases that
are remanded back to the BVA require additional development, and therefore
must be further remanded back to the RO, which of course takes additional
time.140 In fiscal year 2008, the CAVC remanded approximately 68% of new
cases filed.141 Similarly, the BVA remanded 16,096 cases in fiscal year 2008, or
approximately 37% of its total caseload.142
Thus, judicial review has had numerous effects on the BVA. Positive
effects include the transformation of the BVA decision-making process, the
improvement in the quality of BVA decisions, increased attorney representation
of veterans before the BVA, and a uniform body of case law to apply from the
CAVC. Negative effects include the increased time required to adjudicate a
claim at the BVA and an increased number of remanded claims. Overall, how-
ever, the positive effects of judicial review far outweigh the negative effects at
the BVA level.
133 DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN FISCAL YEAR 2008 1 (2009), avail-
able at http://www.va.gov/Vetapp/ChairRpt/BVA2008AR.pdf [hereinafter BVA CHAIRMAN'S
REPORT FOR FY 2008].
134 O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 233. But see Gary E. O'Connor, Rendering to Caesar: A Re-
sponse to Professor O'Reilly, 53 ADMIN L. REv. 343, 345 (2001).
135 O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 249.
136 Id. at 248.
1 Id. at 248-49.
138 Id. at 233-34.
139 See generally Ridgway, supra note 93.
1 Cragin, supra note 12, at 35.
141 CAVC ANNUAL REPORT FY 2008, supra note 91 (noting that out of 4128 new cases filed,
603 were "[a]ffirmed or dismissed in part, reversed/vacated & remanded in part;" 559 were
"[r]eversed/vacated & remanded;" and 1625 were remanded). It should be noted, however, that a
large number of these cases were remanded pursuant to a joint motion for remand by the parties,
rather than by judicial decision. Id.
142 BVA CHAIRMAN'S REPORT FOR FY 2009, supra note 128, at 23.
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B. Effects at the RO Level
As was noted above, most of the effects of judicial review, both positive
and negative, have been felt at the BVA level. Although the effects of judicial
review have also been felt at the RO level, due to the administrative, rather than
the legal nature of the RO adjudication process, the effects of judicial review are
much different at the RO level. 14 3 In this regard, a brief background of the RO
adjudication process is first necessary.
While decisions at the BVA are made by attorneys, decisions at the RO
are made by non-attorney adjudicators.144 Thus, the decision-making process at
the RO is quite different than the decision-making process at the BVA, which
relies heavily on CAVC and Federal Circuit decisions, as well as citations to
numerous statutes and regulations.14 5 RO adjudicators tend to rely more on the
VA Adjudication Procedure Manual, as well as medical and legal guidance from
the VBA Director of Compensation and Pension Service, circulars (such as fast
letters and training letters), and Service Center Manager memoranda, which
state local VA offices promulgate. 14 6 These documents are generally regarded
as "quasi-legal authority," since their primary purpose is to distill practical ap-
plication of laws, regulations, and court precedents for RO adjudicators.147
Thus, practically speaking, "there is little, if any, distinction" between legal au-
thority and administrative guidance at the RO level.148
Although the RO's non-attorney adjudicators have often undergone ex-
tensive training in the area of veterans benefits law, most of this training comes
from firsthand experience at the RO, administrative materials, and local VA
customs and traditions, rather than formal legal training or understanding of
CAVC decisions.14 9 Accordingly, the effects of judicial review on the RO's are
only what those at VA's Central Office tell them. VA Central Office guidance
on how to interpret CAVC decisions usually comes in the form of a Decision
Assessment Document (DAD). 5 o
Nonetheless, the effects of judicial review can still be felt at the RO lev-
el. 5 ' By far, the greatest effect of judicial review on RO adjudicators is in the
143 See generally Parker, supra note 7, at 208.
'4 Id. at 208.
145 Id. at 220.
146 Id. at 210. For further explanation of these documents, see supra notes 18-24.
147 Id. at 211.
148 Id. at 212.
149 Parker, supra note 7, at 217.
150 Id. at 210 n.24 (stating that the DAD "is another form of VBA circular that is a self-
contained summary of precedential court cases for use by the VBA adjudicator. The DAD pro-
vides a summary of the case, the impact of the case on VBA, and a discussion of the facts and the
court's reasons").
151 See Cragin, supra note 12, at 35.
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area of claims development. 152 Indeed, many have commented that one of the
CAVC's greatest contributions to the veterans benefits process "has been to
breathe life into the long-standing statutory obligation of the VA 'to assist . .. a
claimant in developing the facts pertinent to the claim."" 5 3 The clearest illustra-
tion of this statement is the passage of the VCAA, which redefined the VA's
duties to notify and assist.15 4 Thus, because nearly all of the development re-
quired pursuant to the VA's duty to assist takes place at the RO level, many RO
employees have come to regard judicial review as negatively impacting the vet-
erans' benefits adjudication process.'55  In fact, between 1998 and 2008, the
average time to process a veteran's initial disability claim increased from four
months to six months, even though the number of VA claims processors had
doubled.15 6
As will be discussed in the section that follows, this Article asserts that
simplifying the veterans' benefits adjudication process by eliminating at least
one level of RO review is required to provide veterans with more timely deci-
sions. In addition, having attorney adjudicators at the RO level by regionalizing
the BVA would also result in more quality decisions issued, thus preventing
many remands and allowing judicial review to have its intended effects on the
VA as a whole. As is explained more fully below, the best way to achieve this
objective is to restructure the VA adjudication process as outlined in this para-
graph.
152 See id.
1 Barton F. Stichman, The Era of Reform Generated by the U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals,
38 FED. B. NEWS & J. 494,494 (1991).
154 Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096
(2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.).
us See Thomas J. Reed, Parallel Lines Never Meet: Why the Military Disability Retirement and
Veterans Affairs Department Claims Adjudication Systems are a Failure, 19 WIDENER L.J. 57, 85
(2009) ("The development step is continuous; it does not stop with the accumulation of records
from the NARA or the VA . . .. This step overlaps with adjudication because the RO will contin-
ue to accumulate evidence while adjudicating a claim."); see also Parker, supra note 7, at 218
("[Nlonlawyer VBA adjudicators are blindsided by the Federal Circuit's reading of an unfamiliar
and purely legal civil law concept into VA administrative law. Indeed, the nonlawyer VBA adju-
dicator, being more familiar with such sub-regulatory resources than the Savitz Court itself, or
most lawyer BVA adjudicators, performs the impossible mental task of trying to recall a mention
of such a concept as the common law mailbox rule in any of VA's regulations, directives, or me-
moranda, or in any previous training. Finding none, the nonlawyer VBA adjudicator is more likely
to ask, 'Where did such a rule come from?' The nonlawyer finds little direction or practicality in
the highly ethereal legal standards of shifting burden-bearing in the raising and rebuttal of such a
presumption with which even the courts struggle.").
156 Philpott, supra note 129.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS
From the time of our nation's founding, notions of law and justice have
garnered a great deal of respect.' Indeed, in order to "think like [a] lawyer,"
one must be able to master "the art of legal analysis."' 58 This includes the abili-
ty to learn rules of law, learn how courts interpret the law, and develop the abili-
ty to foresee what the law may become. 59 In so doing, "[e]mphasis is placed on
the parsing of statutes and, of particular importance in a case law system, of
judicial opinions; on learning the contours of fundamental legal doctrines; [and]
on professional values[.]"l 60 Thus, as is the case with other professions, the
"distinguishing mark" of a lawyer "is knowledge that other people do not
have ... ."161
Non-attorney adjudicators at the RO fall under this category of individ-
uals who do not have specialized knowledge of the law.' 6 2 Although RO adju-
dicators are frequently praised for their "vast institutional knowledge" of the VA
system, the fact of the matter is that many do not possess the analytical abilities
to "think like a lawyer."' 63 There are two reasons often cited for not having
lawyers as adjudicators at the RO: (1) the VA benefits adjudication process is
traditionally a nonadversarial system, and (2) the introduction of lawyers would
delay the already vast number of claims that are handled by the RO each year.1
With regard to the former reason, the traditional nonadversarial nature
of the VA system, it should be noted that when the VJRA eliminated the $10 fee
limit for attorneys representing veterans at the CAVC, many feared that the VA
system would become flooded with adversarial attorneys.'6 5 However, several
years after the imposition of judicial review, these fears proved to be un-
founded.16 6 Indeed, this still appears to be the case as the VA has recently lifted
157 See WILSON HUHN, THE FIvE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 7 (2d ed. 2008).
15 Id. at 11.
159 Id.
160 RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 1 (2004).
161 STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS 7 (3d ed.
2007).
162 Parker, supra note 7, at 208.
163 Interviews with several employees who have both BVA and RO experience, in Washington,
D.C. (Apr. 30, 2009 and May 6, 2009) [hereinafter Interviews] (notes from interviews on file with
author; those being interviewed wished to remain anonymous). Employees noted that lawyers
were phased out as RO adjudicators in the 1970s due to an increase in market salaries. Id.
164 See, e.g., Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that "[t]his court
and the Supreme Court both have long recognized that the character of the veterans' benefits
statutes is strongly and uniquely pro-claimant" and describing "the historically non-adversarial
system of awarding benefits to veterans"); Trilles v. West, 13 Vet. App. 314, 326 (2000) (describ-
ing "the VA pro-claimant nonadversarial claims adjudication process").
16s See Cragin, supra note 12, at 27; Wright, supra note 114, at 443.
See Wright, supra note 114, at 445.
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its ban on lawyers representing veterans at the VA.167 Moreover, attorney in-
volvement at the CAVC has been viewed as overwhelmingly positive.16 8
With regard to the latter reason, the vast number of claims handled by
the RO, the author agrees that the sheer number of claims handled by the RO
should not be underestimated. In fiscal year 2008, the VA estimated that it re-
ceived 891,547 new claims, over 53,000 more than the 838,141 received in fis-
cal year 2007.169 In order to deal with this large number of claims, RO adjudica-
tors are expected to produce 3.5 credits per day, whereas attorneys at the BVA
are expected to produce 3 credits per week. 170 Thus, at the RO, most adjudica-
tors are focused on the quickest way to decide a claim, and not necessarily on
the policy behind the cases or the statutes and regulations being applied.17 1 The
unfortunate reality of this system is that most RO adjudicators are focused on
"how they can get the claim off their desk" as opposed to how to best serve vet-
erans. 172 As one VA employee observed, "doing justice and moving the case
along clash[]."l 73 Thus, the argument against using attorneys as adjudicators at
the RO level is that attorneys with formal legal training conduct a more in-depth
analysis of each claim, which therefore would increase the overall time required
to process the claim.
Accordingly, throughout the past twenty years of judicial review in the
veterans' benefits arena, the greatest effect, by far, has been on the increase in
processing time required to adjudicate a veteran's claim. 174 Despite this fact,
judicial review has consistently been regarded as a positive addition to the vet-
erans' benefits adjudication system.17 5 Thus, in order to more fully appreciate
167 Pub. Law No. 109-461, § 101, 120 Stat. 3408 (2006); see also 38 U.S.C. §§ 5902-5905
(2006) (eliminating the prohibition on the charging of fees for services of an attorney or agent
provided before the Board of Veterans' Appeals makes its first final decision in the case). As
amended, section 5904 now allows accredited attorneys and agents to charge fees for services
provided after a notice of disagreement (NOD) has been filed with the VA Regional Office (RO)
in the case.
168 Russo, supra note 9, at 28.
169 U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL
ANALYSIS, available at http://www4.va.gov/budget/report/ (On the lower right hand of the web-
page, next to text reading "Fiscal Year 2008," click the hyperlink "Archive.").
170 Interviews, supra note 163. At the RO, cases with multiple issues are divided so that the
adjudicator receives one credit for every seven issues. Id. At the BVA, decisions and remands, no
matter how many issues, are each assigned one credit no matter how many issues are involved in
the claim; however, cases that involve a decision and a remand receive 1.5 credits. Id. See Quan-
tity v. Quality: Examining the Veterans Benefits Administration's Employee Work Credit and
Management Systems, Hearing Before the H. Committee on Veterans' Affairs, 11Ith Cong.
(2010) (statement of Eric Christenson, Managing Director of Health Research Policy, Institute for
Public Research CAN).
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 See, e.g., Philpott, supra note 129.
1 See, e.g., Farley, supra note 37; Hagel & Horan, supra note 12; Russo, supra note 9.
88 [Vol. 113
22
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 113, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol113/iss1/8
SIMPLIFY, SIMPLIFY SIMPLIFY
the effects of judicial review while continuing to provide veterans with quality,
timely decisions, the VA should simplify its claims adjudication process by eli-
minating one if its many levels of review and regionalizing the BVA.
Currently, there are several levels of review of a VA benefits claim.
Veterans Claims Examiners (VCEs) first handle a claim by conducting initial
development, such as requesting service treatment records when a claim is filed
and sending out initial VCAA notice letters. 176 Next, Veterans Service Repre-
sentatives (VSRs) handle the claim.177 VSRs are not raters, but are responsible
for additional evidentiary development, such as ordering a VA medical exami-
nation. 178 Next, Rating Veterans Service Representatives (RVSRs) perform the
initial adjudication of the veteran's claim via an RO rating decision. 7 9 If a vet-
eran files an NOD, the veteran may elect to have a Decision Review Officer
(DRO) conduct a de novo review of the claim. DROs tend to have years of VA
experience which translates into a considerable amount of institutional know-
ledge.180 Accordingly, DROs perform a more in-depth review than RVSRs.18 1
Although some DROs are attorneys, there is little, if any, attorney involvement
at the RO level.18 2 Currently, the VA has pilot programs in place in several ROs
to explore various automated methods that may assist in quickening the pace of
the adjudication process.'8 3 Despite these programs, however, VA attorneys are
typically not involved in the process until a veteran appeals his or her case to the
BVA.184
176 Interviews, supra note 163.
177 Id.; see also Day in the Life: Veterans Service Representative, available at
http://www4.va.gov/JOBS/career types/walker-video.asp.
178 Interviews, supra note 163.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 See Regina Dennis, Waco VA Regional Office Adds 100 Jobs to Speed Up Claims Process,
THE WACO TRIBUNE (Feb. 19, 2010), available at http://www.wacotrib.com/news/Waco-VA-
Regional-Office-adds-100-jobs-to-speed-up-claims-process.html (noting that the VA currently has
pilot programs in place at the RO's located in Pittsburgh, PA; Baltimore, MD; Little Rock, AR;
and Providence, RI).
184 See MacKlem v. Shinseki, No. 08-1409, 2010 WL 3155498 (Vet. App. Aug. 10, 2010)
(stating that "In an effort to reduce delays, VA has added thousands of new claims processors ....
The adjudicators are generally not attorneys." (citing DANIEL HARRIS, FINDINGS FROM RATERS AND
VSOs SURVEYS 14 (The CNA Corporation, May 2007) (published as part of the Veterans' Disabil-
ity Benefits Commission))), available at http://www.vetscommission.org/displayContents.asp?
id-4 (finding that 26% of adjudicators do not have college degrees, 40% have college degrees,
and 34% have "[m]ore [t]han [c]ollege"); see also Parker, supra note 7, at 208 ("In VA, there are
both nonlawyer adjudicators at the local VA offices within the agency of the Veterans Benefits
Administration (VBA) and lawyer adjudicators at the appellate agency of the Board of Veterans'
Appeals.").
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Because there are so many levels of review of veterans' benefits claims,
the process is quite lengthy and oftentimes complex. Howard Pierce, Chief Ex-
ecutive Officer of PKC Corp., a software company that works specifically with
health care clients, testified in 2008 that his company was tasked to set up a
computerized decision-making model to be used by VA claims adjudication
staff.185  He stated that his staff was "stunned" by the complexity of the
process. Pierce elaborated that "we have never seen anything more complex
[than the VA claims system." 87
Thus, it seems that if there is one lesson to be taken away from the past
twenty years of judicial review, it is that the veterans' benefits adjudication
process must somehow be simplified. The easiest and most logical way to
achieve this goal would be to eliminate one of the many levels of review. To
this end, since there is a need for better decision making at the RO level, this
Article proposes eliminating the role of the RVSR, having DROs perform initial
rating actions, and regionalizing the BVA, such that BVA attorneys would issue
decisions in place of the current SOC.188 Currently, the SOC re-adjudicates a
veteran's claim after a NOD has been filed.189 The main argument for keeping
the SOC is that it provides a veteran with the laws and regulations pertinent to
his or her appeal; however, such regulations could just as easily be included in
an initial rating decision. 190 Because the SOC is essentially a duplicative rating
decision for claims that have been appealed, the overall veterans' benefits adju-
dication process would benefit from eliminating this stage of review.
Eliminating or regionalizing the BVA is not a new topic. In designing
an "ideal" system for administering veterans' benefits, one of the nation's lead-
ing scholars in veterans law, William F. Fox, stated that he would "simply elim-
inate the Board of Veterans' Appeals."' 91 As rationale for this proposal, he
stated that by using attorneys and Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) to conduct
formal adjudications at the RO level, the VA would be able to simplify its cur-
rent system of intra-agency review. 192 He also indicated that in attempting to
create such an ideal system, "judicial review must be preserved."1 93 He con-
cluded by stating that he "firmly believe[d] that good decisions by [his] newly-
commissioned corps of ALJs in a system in which lawyers fully participate
185 Philpott, supra note 129. For more information on PKC, see
http://www.pkc.com/AboutUs.aspx.
186 Philpott, supra note 129.
187 Id.
188 38 C.F.R. § 19.29 (2010).
189 See 38 U.S.C. 7105(d)(1) (2006).
190 See 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(1)(A)-(C) (2006).
191 Fox, supra note 92, at 344.
192 Id.
19 Id. at 345.
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through the entire agency decisional process would likely produce fewer ap-
peals."l 94
Similarly, as was noted previously, one of the nation's leading scholars
in administrative law, James T. O'Reilly, has also suggested eliminating the
BVA. 195 In this proposal, O'Reilly noted that at that time, the average time to
resolve a VA appeal was 745 days and that justice delayed was justice denied. 96
Overall, O'Reilly vigorously argued that changes to the current system were
necessary in order to produce better results in a more timely fashion.197
The author of this Article agrees that at least one layer of review must
be removed in order to reconcile quality with quantity in VA benefits decisions,
but that the level removed should not be the BVA. The VJRA deliberately
maintained the BVA as the final administrative adjudicator at the VA.198 Fur-
ther, given modern notions of due process and the need for independent review
outside the agency, the CAVC should not be the level that is eliminated ei-
ther.199 Indeed, veterans would be better served by regionalizing rather than
eliminating the BVA and placing BVA attorneys at each of the ROs. First, the
BVA should not be eliminated because as noted above, the CAVC is an integral
part of the veterans benefits system, and to do so would most likely greatly in-
crease the CAVC's workload, resulting in further delays in the process. Second,
although many at the RO argue that the in-depth review conducted by attorneys
would slow down the current claims adjudication process, this would most like-
ly be only a temporary setback. Indeed, once attorneys are involved at the RO,
veterans claims will be better developed early on, thus preventing the need for
many remands later in the process.200
Third, RO decisions will become better written and articulated. Cur-
rently, one of the main reasons for remands from the BVA to the RO is due to
the "subpar writing skills" of many claims adjudicators. 2 0 ' Although the CAVC
often remands BVA decisions on similar grounds (reasons or bases), BVA deci-
sions are, generally speaking, more detailed and better articulated than most RO
rating decisions and DRO decisions.202
194 Id.
195 O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 233.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 See Farley, supra note 37 (noting that in discussing the need for judicial review of veterans'
benefits, the House Veterans' Affairs Committee favored abolishing the Board, whereas the Se-
nate Veterans' Affairs Committee did not, and that in the agreed upon compromise that would
become the Veterans' Judicial Review Act of 1988, the Board remained intact and the CAVC was
created); see also Veterans' Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687 (1988).
199 See, e.g., Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
200 See Fox, supra note 92, at 346.
201 Interviews, supra note 163.
202 Id. This statement is also affirmed by the author's own knowledge of working with both
BVA and RO decisions at the BVA and the CAVC.
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Fourth, there are a great number of practical benefits that would result
from having BVA attorneys located at ROs. For example, time would be saved
because claims files would not have to be shipped from the RO to the BVA's
centralized location in Washington, D.C. In addition, both attorney and non-
attorney adjudicators would benefit from daily interactions that would allow the
sharing of various types of institutional knowledge and understanding of court
precedents. Finally, RO adjudicators would be less likely to pass on a decision
they think is likely to be reversed or remanded when the BVA reviewer is down
the hall, rather than an anonymous figure located in the Nation's capital.
In summary, the past two decades of judicial review in the veterans'
benefits arena has had a positive impact on the VA and veterans themselves.
However, due to the increased time required to process veterans' claims, the
system must be simplified. As described above, the most beneficial way to do
so would be to eliminate the SOC and regionalize the BVA. In addition to de-
creasing the VA's current multi-layered system of review, utilizing attorneys at
the RO level will translate into a more fully developed record and, as such, few-
er remands from the CAVC.
VI. CONCLUSION
Today, it is easy to take judicial review in the United States for granted.
The idea of judicial review has become so deeply entrenched in our present con-
stitutional law system that it is difficult to imagine how our legal system would
function without it.20 3 However, for many veterans, this was not always the
case. As has been discussed above, veterans were excluded from judicial re-
view until the passage of the VJRA in 1988. Thus, in analyzing the effects of
twenty years of judicial review on the veterans' benefits adjudication system, it
is important not to take judicial review for granted. On the contrary, it is impor-
tant to continue to reflect on how judicial review has affected the VA, veterans,
and their advocates.
With regard to veterans themselves, one would be hard-pressed to find
much information suggesting that they have been substantially harmed by judi-
cial review. Although the amount of time it takes for the CAVC to issue a deci-
sion has increased from 364 days in 1999 to 446 days in 2008,204 judicial review
has produced numerous benefits to the veterans' benefits adjudication system.
In this regard, the VA now issues more quality decisions, and it has interpreted
many statues and regulations in a more pro-veteran manner. The consensus is
that since judicial review, veterans have received more equitable treatment in
VA decisions. 20 5  Likewise, although some veterans' service organizations
feared that they would become obsolete in light of the VJRA provisions that
203 D. Brooks Smith, Judicial Review in the United States, 45 DuQ. L. REv. 379, 382 (2007).
204 CAVC ANNUAL REPORT FY 2008, supra note 91.
205 Hagel & Horan, supra note 12, at 50.
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allowed attorneys to represent veterans at the CAVC, judicial review has cer-
tainly not put any veterans' service organizations "out of business."2 06
However, the first twenty years of judicial review have also taught us
that despite these benefits, the system is not perfect. Celebrating the twentieth
anniversary of judicial review in the VBA system and the elevation of the VA to
a cabinet department 207 invites judicious analysis of the pros and cons of the
veterans' benefits adjudication process. As is argued throughout this Article,
the past twenty years of judicial review have served as a reminder that the VA
system is in desperate need of simplification.
Because there are so many levels of review of a VA decision that is ap-
pealed-an initial rating decision, a statement of the case, a possible supplemen-
tal statement of the case, a BVA decision, and a CAVC decision-there is a
noticeable disconnect between each level of review. Furthermore, because each
decision prior to the BVA decision is made by non-attorney adjudicators, there
is an even greater divide between the RO and the BVA, even though both are
part of the VA. Thus, in order to simplify the overall adjudication process, the
BVA should be regionalized, effectively eliminating the SOC level of review.
In addition to decreasing the time required to process appeals, having attorneys
performing RO adjudications will enhance the quality of initial VA decisions
and will ensure that CAVC precedents play a larger role in such decisions.
Therefore, after two decades of judicial review, the veterans' benefits
system has improved, but it still has a long way to go. Although the initial im-
pact of judicial review on the VA was certainly "profound,"208 twenty years
later, its effects have shown that it is now time to "simplify." Providing veter-
ans with due process was undoubtedly a step in the right direction, and it was a
step that was long overdue. Although those within the VA have remained reluc-
tant to change, 20 9 the passage of the VJRA provides hope that further extraordi-
nary changes to the system, such as the ones suggested in this article, are possi-
ble, and, more importantly, that such changes would greatly benefit the current
veterans' benefits adjudication process.
206 Russo, supra note 9, at 29.
207 See DEP'T. OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VA HISTORY IN BRIEF 26, available at
http://wwwl.va.gov/opa/feature/history/docs/histbrf.pdf (noting the elevation of the BVA to a
cabinet department on March 15, 1989).
208 Effects of Judicial Review, supra note 17.
209 See Parker, supra note 7, at 211 (describing the attitude of VA adjudicators: we "[a]re apt to
be strongly prejudiced in favor of whatever is countenanced by antiquity, enforced by authority,
and recommended by custom" (alteration in original) (quoting Robert Hall)).
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